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Case No. 11113 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOSE F. MONTOYA I 
Appellant, 
vs. 
BERTHANA INVESTMENT CORPORATION I INC. I 
and ROBERT E. SANDERS and SHIRLEY M. 
SANDERS, husband and wife, 
Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action for wrongful death resulting from 
D<"rsona 1 injury sustained by the deceased at a public roller 
:;1<.0ting rink in Ogden, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower Court sustained a motion for Summary 
---
judgment filed by the defendant, Berthana Investment 
Corporation, Inc., which motion was based upon the 
pleadings, the affidavit, and on the briefs filed in said 
matter. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plain tiff seeks reversal of the order dismissing 
plaintiff's case as to the said defendant, Berthana Invest-
ment Corporation, Inc., and remanding the case to the 
lower Court for trial. 
STA TE MENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, father of the deceased, filed his 
complaint for damages against both the Berthana Invest-
ment Corporation, Inc., as owner and lessor of the 
premises known as the "Berthana Ballroom and Roller-
skating Rink" and against Robert E. Sanders and Shirley M. 
Sanders, husband and wife, as lessees and as managers 
and operators of the skating rink. (R. l) 
For purposes of this brief, the defendant, Berthana 
lrivestment Corporation, Inc., will be referred to as 
Berthana (lessor) and the defendants, Robert E. Sanders 
and Shirley M. Sanders will be referred to as Sanders 
2. 
(lessees) . 
The a mended Complaint (R. 15) alleges that 
r..,nnie Montoya, age 11, paid an admission charge and 
received permission to rollerskate on said premises and 
while skating was pushed or fell violently against one of 
the protruding ~rmrests described in the complaint and 
suffered injury to his kidneys as a result of which he 
died from interna 1 bleeding later the same day. 
The answer of the defendant, Berthana, to the 
original complaint was a general denial and alleged con-
tributory negligence by way of defense. (R. 2) The 
answer of the defendants, Sanders, was basically the same 
except for the defense of assumption of risk and the further 
allegation that the accident was caused by negligence of 
third persons not parties to the action. (R. 4) Thereafter, 
the defendant, Berthana, filed its Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the grounds "that the answer of the defendant, 
l~obert E. Sanders to the plaintiff's interrogatories and the 
dttached affidavit of the eye witness, Alma Clare, conclu-
sively show as a matter of law that the plaintiff does not 
have a claim against this defendant II (R. 12) 
3. 
l 
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint,· (R. 15) and 
the defendants, Sanders, filed their answer to the amended 
complaint. (R. 16) The defendant, Berthana, renewed its 
motion for Summary Judgment (R. 17) which was granted 
by the lower Court. (R. 23) The facts as set forth in the 
amended complaint (R. 15) and which are the basis of this 
action against the defendant, Berthana, are as follows: 
A. It leased the premises for dancing and roller-
skating purposes only; 
B. It knew that the public would be patrons of 
the rink and would pay admission for said use; 
C. It would allow no alterations of the premises 
by lessee without prior written consent of the lessor; 
D. It knew that the hall was specifically designed 
for dancing only and was used by the public for that 
exclusive purpose for a number of years; 
E. It knew or should have known that wooden arm-
rests extended outwards towards the da nee floor from 
benches around the floor; 
F. It knew that said premises were now being used 
by the public for both dancing and rollerskating; 
4. 
G. It knew that a large number of persons, 
including children, would be admitted to said premises 
as patrons for skating; 
H. It knew that there was no proper railing or 
other protective device to prevent skaters from falling into 
or being pushed against said armrests which constituted a 
risk to skaters using the rink; 
I. It knew that the Sanders (Lessees) would use 
said premises for skating ptr poses before the area could 
be put in a reasonably safe condition and that lessees 
wruld not make such changes; 
J. That both defendants knew, or should have 
known, of the hazards in the construction of said area 
when used for skating purposes and of the possibility of 
injury to persons skating there, especially to children; and 
K. That the deceased, while skating on said rink, 
was pushed or fell violently against one of the protruding 
Jrmrests and suffered personal injuries as a result of 




THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT, BERTHANA 
INVESTMENT CORPORATION I INC. I AND AGAINST THE 
PLAINTIFF 
To justify the lower Court in granting the motion 
for Summary Judgment, it was necessary to find that as a 
matter of law there was no negligence on the part of the 
landlord as owner of the premises and that it owed no duty 
to the deceased. We ·submit that the facts above alleged 
and which, for purposes of this motion must be deemed to 
be true, show negligence and that a question of fact for the 
jury has been raised. The most recent case handed down by 
the Utah State Supreme Court relating to the matter of 
Summary Judgment is Singleton vs. Alexander et al. (1967) 
431 P(2) 126, 19 U. (2) 292. The opinion states in part as 
follows: 
"It will be noted that a summary judgment can 
be granted only when it is shown that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party also is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law under those facts. The 
Court cannot consider the weight of testimony 
or the credibility of witnesses in considering a 
motion for summary judgment. He simply 
determines that there is no disputed issue of 
6. 
material fact and that as a matter of law a 
party should prevail ... " 
and, " ... However, when it comes to det-
ermining negligence, contributory negligence, 
and causation, courts are not in such a good 
position to make a total determination of its 
own, and that is: Did the conduct of a party 
measure up to that of the reasonably prudent 
man, and, if not, was it a proximate cause 
of the harm done? See Moore, Federal 
Practice, paragraphs 56 .15 (1. -0), P. 2285, 
and 56.17(42), P. 2583; Barron and Holtzoff, 
Fed. Pr. & Procedure. Paragraph 1232.l, p. 106." 
We submit that the issues raised by this case are not such 
that "a 11 reasonably men must draw the same conclusions 
from them." 
Just what is the duty of lessor of premises? 
The correct rule in the present case is to be found 
in 32 Am. Jr., page 533, which, after defining the general 
rule between the landlord and tenant, then states: 
"It is well settled that where the lease is 
for a public purpose, such as for a theater, 
the liability of the landlord for injuries from 
defects in the condition of the demised 
premises is not governed by all of the rules 
applying to leases generally. Where there 
is a lease for a purpose involving use by 
the public, the rights of business patrons 
to recover for injuries from defects in the 
demised premises are not limited to the 
rights of the tenant. There are a number of 
decisions which hold that where the property 
7. 
_is leased for public or semipublic purposes, 
and at the time is not safe for the purposes 
intended, and the owner knew, or by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence would have 
known, of such conditions, he is liable to 
~he patrons of such premises for damages 
resulting from such conditions, for it is his 
duty to make such property reasonably safe 
for the purposes intended, or to discontinue 
the conditions, as the case may be." (Italics 
ours) 
We also call attention to 123 ALR 868 which deals 
with leases for a particular purpose, and cites with approval 
•Restatement of the Law of Torts, paragraph 359. It states: 
"A lessor who leases land for a purpose 
which involves the admission of a large 
number of persons as patrons of his lessee, 
is subject to liability for bodily harm caused 
to them by an artificial condition existing 
when the lessee took possession, if the lessor 
(a) knew or should have known of the condition 
and realized or should have realized the un-
reasonable risk to them involved therein, and 
(b) had reason to expect that the lessee would 
admit his patrons before the land was put in a 
reasonably safe condition for their reception." 
See also 123 ALR, 872 which defines the responsi-
bitity of the lessor of places of amusement. 
L 
"III Leases for particular purposes. 
a. Places of amusement. Places of amusement 
constitute an exception to the general rule of 
caveat emptor with respect to a landlord's 
liability to those who enter upon the premises in 
the right of the tenant. It is generally recog-
8. 
nized that the lessor of the property for public 
amusement purposes owes to the public, at least 
as to latent defects, the duty of exercising 
ordinary care to provide against defects in the 
premises which render them unsafe for the use 
intended. This includes defects in construc-
tion, defects caused by the property being in 
a state of disrepair at the time of the lease, 
or a condition which, in the nature of things, 
must ultimately result in the property being 
dangerous when put to the use intended." 
(Ita li cs ours) 
The question now before the Court is whether the 
landlord knew or should have known that persons using 
a dance floor for rollerskating purposes might sustain 
injury if projected into protruding armrests which, under 
these circumstances, could be a hazard if not an actual 
nuisance, as to patrons using it. We submit that this is 
a question of fact and to be determined by a jury. 
Rollerskating in a public rink used for that purpose 
by its nature is a hazardous sport. It becomes so by the 
actions and conduct of young people. It is common know-
ledge that children will engage in racing around the rink; 
cutting in and out around other skaters; playing games 
s~1ch as "crack the whip"; and skating faster than they 
'l")Uld. A landlord leasing the premises for skating 
9. 
purposes and knowing said premises were designed for 
ballroom dancing should and could have foreseen that 
kids would engage in horseplay and that protruding arm-
rests were dangerous and hence a nuisance if a skater 
were projected into one of them and sustained injury as 
happened in this case. 
The Utah case of Larsen vs. Calder Park Company, 
(1919) 180 P. 599, 54 U. 325, is a key case on the Lessor-
Lessee relationship and correctly states the law which we 
deem to be applicable and controlling in this case. The 
case was tried before the Court with a jury and a verdict 
rAndered in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant appealed. 
The judgment was affirmed. 
In many respects the Calder Park case closely 
parallels the present case, both as to fact and as to the 
application of the law. In that case the defendant leased 
an amusement park to the lessee for entertainment of the 
pc1blic for profit. One of the leased buildings was used 
Js a shooting gallery and was constructed by the lessor 
:r1ar1y years before the accident in question. As plaintiff 
'<,;s Wdlking along a path a bullet glanced from a target 
10. 
through a hole or crack in the wall of the gallery and 
struck a boy in his eye, causing permanent injury. 
Appellant, lessor, admitted its ownership of the 
park and that it executed the written lease as alleged in 
the complaint and denied the other allegations. 
Counsel in that case, as now, asserted: 
" ... that the general rule is that there is no 
implied warranty on the part of a landlord that 
leased premises are in a safe condition, or 
that he will ke.ep the premises repaired or in 
a safe condition; and that, in the absence of 
an express covenant on the part of the land-
lord to maintain the premises in repair, it is 
generally held that neither the tenant nor a 
guest of the tenant has any right of action 
against the landlord for injuries sustained by 
reason of defects in the premises where there 
was no fraud or misrepresentation on the part 
of the landlord leasing the premises; that the 
overwhelming weight of authority is to the 
effect that, where property at the time of the de-
mise is not a nuisance, and an injury happens 
by some act of the tenant or while the tenant 
has the entire possession or control of the 
premises, the owner is not liable." 
Our Court in answer to this stated: 
"No doubt the law is properly reflected in 
the excerpt quoted from Taylor, but the 
quotation has no application to this case for 
the reason that here the shooting gallery 
building, at the time it was leased by the 
appellant, was in such a condition that it 
constituted a quiescent nuisance. 
11. 
. . . it is manifest that by using the building 
which was intended for use as a shooting 
gallery and which was leased for that purpose, 
in the condition it was in when leased, ... " 
"It was the unsafe condition of the building 
as leased, however, which would expose the 
passer-by to danger and not the sole act of 
the tenant, for the reason that, if the tenant 
used the building at a 11 as a shooting gallery 
in the condition in which it was, the danger 
would certainly be constantly imminent." 
Whether or not· the protruding armrests would expose 
skaters to danger; as they did here, is a question for the jury 
Certainly they constituted a "quiescent nuisance" as defined 
by the Court . 
Our Supreme Court then cited with approval 16 RCL, 
para. 594,p. 1076 as follows: 
"It is the well-settled rule that the landlord is 
properly chargeable with liability to a stranger 
where the cause of injury to the latter is a nui-
sance existing on the premises at the time of 
the demise. No person can create or maintain a 
nuisance upon his premises and escape liability 
for the injury occasioned by it to third persons. 
Nor can a lessor so create a nuisance and then 
escape liability for the oonseguences by leasing 
the premises to a tenant. Nor is it material that 
the negligence of the latter contributed to the 
injury; that may render the lessee also liable, 
but it cannot exempt the lessor from liability. 
Indeed, the nuisance may be merely passive until 
some agency of the lessee intervenes, and the 
Lessor will still be liable. The theory upon 
which the landlord is held to be liable where 
12. 
the premises are leased with a nuisance is that 
he created the nuisance, and will be presumed 
to have intended the continuance thereof, or 
that he acquired title with an existing nuisance 
and knowingly leased them in that condition. In 
either case the a ct of lea sing with the nuisa nee 
is held to raise the presumption that he intended 
the nuisance to be continued. Prior to and at the 
time of the lease, it was the duty of the lessor to 
put an end to the nuisance. If he fails to do 
this, and leases the premises with the nuisance on 
them, he may be deemed, and is deemed, to au-
thorize the continuance of the nuisance, and is 
therefore liable for the conseguences of such 
continuance. Whether, therefore, the defect is 
one of origina 1 construction, or arises from a 
failure to repair, or from the maintenance on 
the premises of any condition endangering the 
health or safety of strangers, whatever its nature, 
if it continues a nuisance, the lessor will be 
responsible for its conseguences if he leases the 
premises with the nuisance upon them, and thus 
authorizes its continuance.* * *" (Ita lies Ours) 
In the present case there is a striking similarily to 
that case in the application of the foregoing rule. The 
agency of the lessee which intervened and was injured was, 
of course, the deceased boy. The nuisance was passive 
until then. There is no question but what the lessor 
(Berthana) leased the premises in a condition which en-
rlangered the hea Ith and safety of strangers, whatever its 
11rJture, and that it is responsible for the consequences. 
The opinion also cites with approval Section 597 
13 • 
(supra) which states: 
"It is not always necessary in order that the 
landlord may be held liable for injuries resulting 
from a nuisance on the leased premises that the 
cause of the injury be in and of itself a nuisance 
at the time of the lease. Leases are made with 
a view to the use of the premises leased, and if 
the injury to the person or property of a stranger 
is the result of the reasonable, ordinary, and 
contemplated manner of use of the premises, the 
lessor will be responsible therefor, although unused, 
and as they stood at the time of the demise, the 
premises were not, of themselves, a nuisance." 
The Court also pnswers the question of public policy 
as it relates to the lea sing of property to a tenant for a 
public use as was done in this case. It said: 
"Where property is leased to a tenant for a 
public use the care required by the landlord 
should be of a higher degree than when the 
property is let for private purposes. Public 
_Eolicy demands such care for the protection of 
the public, and this is particularly applicable 
here in Utah, where public resorts and amusement 
.Q9rks are numerous and their attractions varied 
and alluring." (Ita lies ours) 
With reference to "nuisances" the Court approved 
the following from Joyce, Law of Nuisances, Para. 464, as 
rollows: 
"The lessors or owners of buildings or struc-
tures in which public exhibitions and entertain-
ments are designed to be given, and for admis-
sions to which the lessors directly or indirectly 
receive compensation, are subject to a different 
rule from that in the ordinary cases of leasing 
of buildings, in that while there is in the latter 
no implied warranty on the part of the lessor 
that the buildings are fit and safe for the pur-
poses for which they are used yet in the former 
case the lessors or owners of such buildings or 
structures hold out to the public that the struc-
tures are reasonably safe for the purposes for 
which they are let or used, and impliedly under-
take that due care has been exercised in their 
erection, and such lessor having created an un-
safe and dangerous structure, and not having 
performed his duty in exercising the proper de-
gree of care to know that it was safe, he is 
liable to a person injured by reason of its being 
unsafe or of improper and faulty construction 
whereby it constitutes a nuisance." {Italics ours) 
This statement seems to indicate that there is an 
~plied warranty on the part of the lessor that the building 
' ~fit and safe for the purposes for which they are leased if 
! 
I 
~public exhibitions or amusement and where admission is 
~rged from which the lessor directly or indirectly receives 
I 
~mpensation. Such is the case here. The rental in the lease 
I substantial. 
In conclusion the Court disposed of the question 
I Proximate cause. It cited with approval the following 
~0tetaken from Milwaikee &St. P.R.R. Co. vs. Kellogg, 
lr:.s. 469, 24 L. Ed. 256, cited in Anderson vs. 
!lt1niore & Ohio Ry. Co., 74W. Va. 21, 81 S. E. 581, 
15. 
' L 
"IL. R. A. (N.S.) 892, in which it poses this question: 
"The question always is: Was there an un-
broken connection between the wrongful a ct 
and the injury, a continuous operation? Did 
the facts constitute a continuous succession 
of events, so linked together as to make a 
na tura 1 whole, or was there some new and 
independent cause intervening between the 
wrong and the injury?" 
Of course, the cause of injury and death was the 
existence of the armrest which split his kidney. If the arm-
rest had not existed or had been protected would he have 
suffered such injury? The answer is obviously no. The 
cause which set the others in motion, the cause of causes, 
and without which the accident would not have occurred was 
the condition of the armrest on the bench. 
The Court in the Calder case properly stated: 
"According to the evidence in this case there 
was an unbroken connection between the wrong-
ful act and the injury--between the nuisance 
and the unfortunate result. The question is: 
Was the dilapidated condition of the so-called 
shooting gallery the ca usa sine qua non? 
If the cause had not existed, would the injury 
have taken place? If the wall had been pro-
perly protected and there had been no holes 
or cracks in the wall, would the fragment of 
lead have struck the respondent in the eye 
and blinded him? It is true that there was a 
concurring ca use, but the cause which set the 
others in motion, the ca use of causes, and without 
16. 
which the accident would not have occurred, 
was the condition of the shooting gallery 
wall." 
In the case of Gibson vs . Shelby County Fair 
Association et al., 44 N. W., (2), 362 (1950) the Supreme 
Court of Iowa quoted with a pprova 1 the case of Junkerman 
vs. Tilyou Realty Co., where Justice Cardozo speaking for 
the New York Court of Appeals stated: 
"We may say that those who enter a structure 
designed for public amusement are there at the 
invitation, not only of the lessee who main-
tains it, but also of the lessor who has leased 
it for that purpose, and that the latter's liability 
is merely an instance of the general rule which 
charges an owner of property with a duty toward 
those whom he invites upon it. (Citing Cases.) 
We may say more simply, and perhaps more 
wisely, rejecting the fiction of invitations, that 
the nature of the use itself creates the duty ••. 
Whatever the underlying principle that explains 
the rule, the rule itself is settled." 
This case also cites Barrett vs. Lake Ontario 
Boachimp. Co. (174Ny310, 66N.E. 969)withapproval 
which stated the rule as follows: 
"If the premises are rented for a public purpose 
for which he (the lessor) knows that they are 
unfit and dangerous, he is guilty of negligence 
and may become responsible to persons suffering 
injury while rightfully using them." 
The facts in the case were as follows: 
17. 
Injuries were sustained by plaintiff who was a 
spectator at a hot rod race on the fairgrounds owned b' the 
defendant, association. Petition was dismissed on 
defendant's motion and an appeal taken. Reversed. The 
Supreme Court held that the Petition stated a cause of 
1 action predicating defendant's liability on their leasing 
of premises so defective that they could not be safely used 
for the express purpose of the lease. This case also deals 
with the question of proximate cause. 
The following definition of nuisance has an applic-
ation in the present case: 
"A 'nuisance' arises from the creation or 
maintenance of a condition having a natural 
tendency to cause danger and inflict injury:' 
"Where the natural tendency of an act com-
plained of is to create danger and inflict 
injury on person or property, it may properly 
be found to be a nuisance as a matter of fact, 
but where the act in its inherent nature is so 
hazardous that the danger of extreme and 
serious injury is so probable that it is almost 
a certainty, there is a nuisance as a matter 
of law." Shoemaker vs. City of Parsons, 118 
P. 508, 154 Kan 387 (Italics ours) 
Attached to this brief and in view of the fact that 
~hrre was no trial of the issues, nor exhibits introduced, 
\ie are taking the liberty of including herein pictures of 
18. 
tne benches and armrests taken in the skating rink. They 
are marked as Appendix A and B. It should be noted that 
there is a small platform from the floor to the riser, then 
a step up to the base of the benches. The armrests in 
question extend out beyond the seat area itself and over 
the base. There is absolutely no protection to a person 
projected toward the benches, the skates being stopped at 
the area of the sma 11 platform. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's granting Summary Judgment in favor 
of the defendant, Berthana Investment Corporation, Inc., 
and Robert E. Sanders and Shirley M. Sanders, husband and 
wife, should be reversed and the case remanded to the lower 
court for trial under appropriate instructions. Disposition 
as this court may determine and plaintiff awarded costs on 
appea 1. 
Respectfully submitted, 
P. LeRoy Nelson and 
M. Blaine Peterson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
512 Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah 
19. 


